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WHY WE NEED REED: UNMASKING PRETEXT IN ANTI-
PANHANDLING LEGISLATION 
Joseph Mead* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, there has been a dramatic increase in the 
number of areas where asking for help is restricted or banned.1 Whether 
called begging, panhandling, or solicitation, cities were spurred on by 
concerns of business owners and residents to ban or highly restrict this 
type of speech from occurring in public areas. Yet laws such as these 
have been repeatedly struck down by courts in recent months, fueled in 
large part by the Supreme Court’s decision in Reed v. City of Gilbert.2 
Federal courts reviewing free speech challenges to laws must first 
decide how much scrutiny the law will receive. Courts review laws 
deemed content-based under the highest level of scrutiny, which almost 
always leads to a conclusion that the restriction is unconstitutional. 
Rigorous review is justified by a worry that “village tyrants”3 will be 
swayed by constituents to suppress unpopular views from being 
expressed freely in their cities.4 Content-neutral laws, in contrast, are 
still carefully examined, but with a more deferential posture. The level 
of scrutiny is often the deciding factor in a law’s constitutionality. Reed 
clarified the test for determining the level of scrutiny to be used. 
Prior to Reed, some federal courts upheld laws that, on their face, 
discriminated on the basis of content so long as the laws could be 
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University, Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs & Cleveland-Marshall College of 
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1. NO SAFE PLACE: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 21 (National
Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty 2014), available at http://www.nlchp.org/documents/
No_Safe_Place). 
2. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015). 
3. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
4. Seth F. Kreimer, Good Enough for Government Work: Two Cheers for Content
Neutrality, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1261, 1264-65 (2014). 
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“justified” by a non-censorial motive.5 This approach led to two circuit 
court decisions—subsequently reversed—that rejected First Amendment 
challenges to laws restricting speech that asked for a donation.6 Reed 
clarifies that a non-discriminatory purpose will not save a law that 
discriminates on its face on the basis of content. Thus, Reed explained 
that a law is a content-based restriction on speech if either of the 
following are true: (1) the text of the law makes distinctions based on 
speech’s “subject matter . . . function or purpose” or (2) the purpose 
behind the law is driven by an objection to the content of a message.7 
Yet not everyone welcomed the Supreme Court’s clarification. For 
example, Adam Liptak penned a powerful essay in the New York Times 
suggesting that the potential sweep of the ruling is far broader than the 
Court could have realized.8 
In this essay I argue that, at least in the context of anti-panhandling 
legislation, Reed was a needed answer to local governments passing 
overly broad restrictions motivated by a desire to drive an unpopular 
type of speech from the city square. To illustrate my argument, I use 
anti-panhandling ordinances from three local jurisdictions—the City 
Akron, the City of Fairlawn, and Summit County—as case studies in 
content-neutrality before and after Reed. 
This essay relies on two primary arguments. First, I defend Reed’s 
clarification of the test for content-neutrality as a needed measure to 
prevent censorial purpose from being masked by local government in 
pretextual reasons. To develop this argument, I highlight the mischief 
caused in Reed by drawing on public records, newspaper articles, and 
other contemporary evidence of legislative intent to argue that anti-
panhandling ordinances have become an exercise in concocting 
pretextual justifications that bear little resemblance to the true motives 
behind the restrictions. 
Second, I argue that the restrictions found in anti-panhandling 
ordinances locally and nationally are poorly tailored to satisfy any 
weighty, non-censorial government objective, and therefore are an 
5. Thayer v. City of Worcester, 755 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015) 
6. Norton v. City of Springfield, Ill., 768 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 806 F.3d 411 (7th
Cir. 2015); Thayer v. City of Worcester, 755 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2887 
(2015), declaring ordinance unconstitutional on remand, 2015 WL 6872450, at *15 (D. Mass. Nov. 
9, 2015). 
7. Reed,135 S. Ct. at 2227 (internal citations, quotations, and alterations omitted).
8. Adam Liptak, Court’s Free Speech Expansion Has Far Reaching Consequences, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 17, 2015, available at www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/us/politics/courts-free-speech-
expansion-has-far-reaching-consequences.html?_r=0. 
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unconstitutional abridgement of the right to ask for help.9 In fact, every 
single federal court in recent year (including several decisions issued 
over the past few months) has sided with free speech challengers to anti-
panhandling laws.10 I tie both arguments together as a way of illustrating 
the problems with the City of Akron’s anti-panhandling law, which I am 
currently in the process of challenging. 
II. WHY WE NEED REED: PANHANDLING LAWS AS A CASE STUDY IN
PRETEXT 
Before Reed was decided, the courts of appeals were in disarray 
over how to assess whether a law was content-neutral. Many decisions 
relied on language from the Supreme Court implying that restrictions 
were content neutral if they could be “justified without reference to the 
content of the regulated speech.”11 Using this test for content-neutrality, 
courts would try to decipher the “purpose” behind a restriction to see if it 
was targeting speech based on content or not. Courts following this path 
would give only a cursory review even to ordinances that facially 
discriminated against some speech based on its content. 
9. These two arguments go well beyond the ground covered in my earlier essay on anti-
panhandling laws, which primarily focused on responding to common rationales justifying anti-
panhandling restrictions. Joseph Mead, First Amendment Protection of Charitable Speech, 2015 
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL FURTHERMORE 57 (2015).  
10. Norton v. City of Springfield, Case No. 13-3581, 2015 WL 4714073, at *2 (7th Cir. Aug.
7, 2015); Reynolds v. Middleton, 779 F.3d 222, 232 (4th Cir. 2015); Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 
867 (6th Cir. 2013); Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549 (4th Cir. 2013); Thayer v. 
City of Worcester, No. 13-40057-TSH, 2015 WL 6872450 (D. Mass. Nov. 9, 2015); McLaughlin v. 
City of Lowell, No. 14-10270-DPW, 2015 WL 6453144 (D. Mass. Oct. 23, 2015); Browne v. City 
of Grand Junction, Colorado, No. 14-CV-00809-CMA-KLM, 2015 WL 5728755 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 
2015); Norton & Otterson v. City of Springfield, Case No. 3:15-cv-03276, ECF #14 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 
23, 2015); American Civil Liberties Union of Idaho, Inc. v. City of Boise, 998 F. Supp. 2d 908, 917 
(D. Idaho 2014); Guy v. County of Hawaii, 2014 WL 4702289, at *5 (D. Hawaii 2014); Kelly v. 
City of Parkersburg, 978 F. Supp. 2d 624, 631 (S.D.W.Va. 2013); see also Planet Aid v. City of St. 
Johns, 782 F.3d 318, 328 (6th Cir. 2015); Cutting v. City of Portland, Me., No. 14-1421, 2015 WL 
5306455, at *7 (1st Cir. Sept. 11, 2015); Joseph Mead, First Amendment Protection of Charitable 
Speech, 2015 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL FURTHERMORE 57 (2015). Two recent appellate decisions 
initially upheld anti-panhandling ordinances, but each was subsequently vacated in light of new 
Supreme Court guidance, and ultimately led to a final judgment declaring the ordinances 
unconstitutional. Norton v. City of Springfield, Ill., 768 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 806 F.3d 
411 (7th Cir. 2015); Thayer v. City of Worcester, 755 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 
2887 (2015), declaring ordinance unconstitutional on remand, 2015 WL 6872450, at *15 (D. Mass. 
Nov. 9, 2015). 
11. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“The government’s purpose is
the controlling consideration. A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of 
expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but 
not others. Government regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is ‘justified 
without reference to the content of the regulated speech.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
40 CONLAWNOW [7:37 
This pre-Reed case law was a recipe for mischief (particularly but 
not only in the context of anti-panhandling ordinances) for several 
reasons: (1) it was difficult to determine purpose, (2) it was unsettled 
which purposes were constitutionally suspect and which were not, and 
(3) it led to a charade where law departments would invent rationales for 
laws and throw them into ordinance preambles that were so unrelated to 
the concerns actually considered by the legislators. These issues led to 
an underprotection of speech that was disliked by majorities. 
First, investigation into legislative purpose exists on perilous 
terrain. Such inquiries are criticized even when conducted into the 
relatively formal proceedings of the United States Congress.12 At the 
local level, the challenges grow exponentially. For most cities, there are 
no committee reports, no records of extensive floor debates, no 
discussion over amendments to legislative language. The few required 
legislative procedures that do exist are commonly short-circuited by 
councils eager to adopt new ordinances. In Ohio, for example, while 
cities are typically required to give new legislation three readings, 
councils can bypass this rule by deeming an “emergency” and enacting a 
new law immediately.13 Both Akron and Summit County exploited this 
loophole when enacting their most recent anti-panhandling legislation, 
reducing the time for the proposed law to be formally considered.14 In 
light of the rushed formal deliberative procedures of city councils, 
divining purpose becomes the difficult task of aggregating a variety of 
individual motives into some sort of coherent legislative purpose. 
Beyond information problems are the conceptual ones. Courts 
struggled to define which government objectives were impermissible 
attempts to silence disliked speech, and which were permissible.15 Early 
decisions upheld panhandling bans after citing government interests in 
creating a “pleasant environment,” attracting tourists, and preventing 
exposure to “nuisance” were legitimate goals.16 By placing interests of 
12. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2707 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting). 
13. OHIO REV. CODE 731.17. 
14. SUMMIT CO., OH, ORDINANCE 2013-331 (2016); AKRON, OH, ORDINANCE 356-2006 
(2015). 
15. Clay Calvert, Content-Based Confusion and Panhandling: Muddling A Weathered First
Amendment Doctrine Takes Its Toll on Society’s Less Fortunate, 18 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 249, 251 
(2015); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REV. 297, 316-
17 (1997) (“[T]hese cases reveal an extraordinary doctrinal confusion over the most basic questions 
underlying the Court’s content jurisprudence, and suggest that at least part of that confusion is 
related to the Court’s failure to develop an adequate framework to engage in purpose scrutiny.”). 
16. Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 906 (7th Cir. 2000); Smith v. City of Fort
Lauderdale, Fla., 177 F.3d 954, 956 (11th Cir. 1999). 
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potential listeners over speakers, these decisions gave governments wide 
latitude to censor unpopular speech. 
In 2014, the Supreme Court firmly rejected the notion that listener 
reaction to uncomfortable messages supplied a content-neutral rationale 
for restrictions on speech, at least in the context of public sidewalks and 
fora. In the course of considering a ban on speech near abortion clinics, 
the Court explained that a law: 
would not be content neutral if it were concerned with undesirable ef-
fects that arise from “the direct impact of speech on its audience” or 
“[l]isteners’ reactions to speech.” If, for example, the speech outside 
Massachusetts abortion clinics caused offense or made listeners un-
comfortable, such offense or discomfort would not give the Common-
wealth a content-neutral justification to restrict the speech.”17 
The Court emphasized the fact that a listener on a sidewalk cannot “turn 
the page, change the channel, or leave the Web site” to avoid hearing an 
uncomfortable message is “a virtue, not a vice.”18 Under this new 
standard, courts have consistently rejected arguments that speech such as 
panhandling can be restricted simply because it is bad for business or 
tourism.19 
In contrast to concerns of listener annoyance and offense, 
intimidation and public safety are potentially non-censorial motives, and 
a government restriction based squarely on these might have satisfied the 
test for content-neutrality prior to Reed.20 But danger of censorial 
motives remained even with laws purporting to promote safety. Once 
more, this danger is vividly illustrated by the adoption of anti-
panhandling ordinances. It was simply too easy for law departments to 
invent valid government rationales and throw them into an ordinance’s 
preamble.21 These supposed justifications for the ordinance 
manufactured by the law department would be barely noted by the 
17. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014). 
18. Id. 
19. McLaughlin, 2015 WL 6453144, at *7 (“The First Amendment does not permit a city to
cater to the preference of one group, in this case tourists or downtown shoppers, to avoid the 
expressive acts of others, in this case panhandlers, simply on the basis that the privileged group does 
not like what is being expressed.”); American Civil Liberties Union of Idaho, Inc. v. City of Boise, 
998 F. Supp. 2d 908, 917 (D. Idaho 2014) (“Business owners and residents simply not liking 
panhandlers in acknowledged public areas does not rise to a significant governmental interest.”). 
20. See Reynolds, 779 F.3d at 232 (4th Cir. 2015). 
21. E.g., Christopher Childree, How McCullen Affects San Antonio’s Anti-Panhandling 
Ordinance, 46 ST. MARY’S L.J. 603, 608 (2015) (citing evidence that real purpose behind San 
Antonio’s anti-panhandling ordinance was to promote tourism, not to protect traffic flow as recited 
in preamble). 
42 CONLAWNOW [7:37 
proponents of panhandling restrictions, who instead tend to rest 
primarily on a dislike of panhandler speech. 
For example, prior to Reed, a First Circuit panel considered an anti-
panhandling ordinance with a preamble that mostly (but not exclusively) 
cited valid government reasons, but had been justified by its proponents 
as a needed measure to suppress panhandling as a type of disliked 
speech.22 In a decision that has been subsequently reversed, the First 
Circuit decided to simply credit the preamble and ignore the evidence of 
censorship, upholding the ordinance after a deferential review.23 Reed 
abrogated this decision, and on remand the ordinance previously upheld 
was permanently enjoined in its entirety as unconstitutional.24 
Or, consider the City of Youngstown, Ohio. The City initially 
adopted an ordinance that simply banned “begging” anywhere in the 
City. After I worked with the ACLU of Ohio to convince the City that 
this flat ban was clearly unconstitutional,25 the City repealed the 
ordinance and replaced it with one that restricts solicitation in specific 
ways.26 This history suggests that Youngstown’s first preference would 
be a flat ban on begging, but, failing that, restrictions to limit solicitation 
as much as possible will work as a second-best alternative. 
There is evidence suggesting a similar dynamic is at play behind 
the anti-panhandling ordinances in Akron, Fairlawn, and Summit 
County. Panhandling came to the Akron City Council’s attention several 
times following complaints by merchants and visitors about what they 
perceived to be too much panhandling downtown.27 In 2006, prior to the 
adoption of some of the ordinance’s most severe provisions, Akron 
Deputy Mayor Dave Lieberth explained that restrictive anti-panhandling 
rules would cut down on amount of panhandling, observing that “When 
we survey downtown businesses, panhandling is usually the No. 1 or 
No. 2 complaint.”28 He testified that the ordinance was needed to combat 
“a definite decline in downtown luncheon business” due to 
22. Thayer v. City of Worcester, 755 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2014). 
23. Id. at 68-69. 
24. Thayer v. City of Worcester, 755 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2014), vacated and remanded, 135 
S. Ct. 2887 (2015), on remand, No. 13-40057-TSH, 2015 WL 6872450 (D. Mass. Nov. 9, 2015). 
25. Letter from ACLU Attorney Joseph Mead to John McNally, Mayor of Youngstown, and
Charles Sammarone, Youngstown City Council President (June 4, 2015) available at 
http://www.acluohio.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/LetterToYoungstownOhioRePanhandling2015_0604.pdf. 
26. YOUNGSTOWN, OH, ORDINANCE 509.08 (2016). 
27. H’rg before the Akron Public Safety Committee, June 21, 2006 (on file with the Akron
Clerk of Court) (at 1:21). 
28. Sandra M. Klepach, Strategy targets begging in Akron: Council, mayor hope stricter
rules would cut down on panhandling, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, June 13, 2006.  
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panhandlers.29 Mayor Plusquellic chimed in that panhandling “is really 
an almost disgusting way to take advantage of someone’s kindness.”30 
During a hearing, Councilmember Williams commented “there isn’t any 
disagreement that we have a problem” and that panhandling was 
“adversely affecting a number of people, whether it be businesses, or 
people working downtown.”31 And downtown businesses and 
institutions testified in support of the restrictions as well, explaining that 
panhandling was bad for business and needed to be stopped.32 According 
to press reports, the Act’s supporters repeatedly explained that the goal 
of the panhandling restrictions were to cut down on the number of 
panhandlers in the city.33 Instead of panhandling, the Deputy Mayor 
argued, “Akron as a city has quality programs in place to manage hungry 
and homeless people . . . . What we want people to do is give money to 
those programs instead.”34 
The preamble to Akron’s ordinance admits the unconstitutional 
goal to simply reduce the number of panhandlers to satisfy the business 
community. The preamble explains that “excessive and aggressive 
panhandling has become a concern to business and restaurant owners 
and their patrons,” and that panhandling was needed to “protect[] . . . 
enjoyment of public spaces, particularly in the downtown area.”35 It was 
in the public interest, explained the preamble, to make public areas 
“inviting for residents and visitors:” “persons should be able to move 
freely upon the streets and sidewalks of the city without undue 
29. Stephanie Kist, Panhandling issue draws impassioned testimony, AKRON LEADER 
ONLINE, June 22, 2006.  
30. Sandra M. Klepach, Council considers solicitors: Proposal to register city’s panhandlers
on tap Monday, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, June 17, 2006. 
31. H’rg before the Akron Public Safety Committee, June 21, 2006 (on file with the Akron
Clerk of Court) (at 11:27). 
32. Id. 
33. E.g., Sandra M. Klepach, Strategy targets begging in Akron: Council, mayor hope
stricter rules would cut down on panhandling, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL June 13, 2006 (“City 
Council will consider legislation Monday that would attempt to curtail what city officials call ‘the 
panhandling business.’”); Phil Trexler, New Akron law tightens panhandling, AKRON BEACON 
JOURNAL, June 4, 2008, available at http://www.ohio.com/news/new-akron-law-tightens-
panhandling-1.99496 (“Two years ago, the city of Akron passed legislation hoping to get a handle 
on panhandlers by forcing them to register with Akron police and giving them stricter guidelines on 
where they can ply their trade.”).  
34. Sandra M. Klepach, Strategy targets begging in Akron: Council, mayor hope stricter
rules would cut down on panhandling, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, June 13, 2006. Interestingly, the 
program that the City apparently wanted to support is not actually a City program at all, but a 
church that requires all individuals to attend a chapel service before receiving any help. Service 
information about the Haven of Rest, HAVEN OF REST, https://havenofrest.org/do-you-need-help/  
35. AKRON, OH, ORDINANCE 356-2006 (2015).
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interference from or intimidation or harassment by panhandlers.”36 The 
only evidence cited in support of the ordinance were unidentified 
“studies and reports” and “testimony” on the “effects of panhandling on 
businesses and individuals.”37 Yet also thrown into the preamble are 
unadorned invocations of public safety and access which also 
purportedly justify the law.38 Supporters of the law testified that 
panhandling wasn’t actually unsafe,39 and these safety concerns were not 
the focus of the testimony considered by council in support of the 
legislation.40 Yet they were thrown in as part of the charade that the pre-
Reed cases required cities to act out. Prior to Reed, a reviewing court 
deciding whether the ordinance was content-based would have to 
undertake an undefined inquiry into all of this evidence—and more—to 
ascertain which statements and motives count, and for which purpose. 
A similar dynamic existed in Fairlawn. The preamble to the City of 
Fairlawn’s anti-panhandling ordinance cites only “safety and welfare” 
concerns,41 yet according to press reports, the comments from the 
members of council simply emphasized ridding the town of undesired 
speakers. The Mayor expressed his disbelief that begging was 
constitutionally protected.42 City Council President explained that “I’ve 
always been of the belief that if you want to give, give to a charity, not 
the people on the streets.”43 Another Council Member hoped that the law 
would “deter people from panhandling. It gives the city a better 
appearance.”44 These unconstitutional motives45 help explain why the 
law is written as broadly as it is, do little to tailor restrictions to public 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. H’rg before the Akron Public Safety Committee, June 21, 2006 (on file with the Akron
Clerk of Court).  
40. H’rg before the Akron Public Safety Committee, June 21, 2006 (on file with the Akron
Clerk of Court). Indeed, the strongest “evidence” adduced during the testimony in support of the 
safety rationale were a few “friend of a friend” anecdotes of criminal behavior—behavior, such as 
theft that was already illegal under existing law—supposedly committed by a solicitor. The Act’s 
supporters admitted that the real concern was the perception of safety: even when there is no threat, 
suburbanites experience fear when being approached by a stranger asking for a donation. Id. One 
supporter implied that someone being approached by a “black man, a black gentleman” who is 
asking for money would feel intimidated. Id. (25:00). This is hardly the stuff of solid constitutional 
decision-making. 
41. FAIRLAWN, OH, ORDINANCE 2012-016A (2015). 
42. Scott Piepho, Are Fairlawn’s Panhandling Regulations Constitutional?, DAILY LEGAL 
NEWS (May 2, 2012), available at http://www.akronlegalnews.com/editorial/3621 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Mead, supra note 9. 
2015] WHY WE NEED REED 45 
safety concerns, and instead effectively driving all panhandling from the 
City.46 
Prior to Reed, these anti-solicitation laws were constitutionally 
questionable, but they stood a fighting chance in court. As long as law 
directors were clever enough to throw in some public safety recitations, 
there was always the chance that courts would ignore the substantial 
evidence of pretext, and uphold even laws that on their face target a 
single type of speech. Perhaps more troubling, discussed below, the 
ultimately enacted restrictions often bore so little relationship with the 
supposed interests being advanced that it became almost laughable. 
Reed changes the calculus. No longer is the city law director’s job 
simply an imaginative exercise in writing fictitious preambles. Reed tells 
cities to instead pass restrictions that either don’t discriminate on the 
basis of content, or that are narrowly tailored to further a compelling 
government interest. As discussed in the next section, this analysis is 
fatal for anti-solicitation ordinances. 
III. ORDINANCES THAT SINGLE OUT SOLICITATION FOR SPECIAL
RESTRICTIONS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Under Reed, any law that draws distinctions based on speech’s 
“subject matter . . . function or purpose” is a content-based rule that is 
presumptively unconstitutional that must overcome strict scrutiny.47 
Anti-panhandling ordinances on their face impose restrictions on 
solicitation that do not exist for other types of speech, and therefore are 
content-based, regardless of the government’s supposed purpose in 
enacting them.48 
Content-based laws “are presumptively unconstitutional and may 
be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored 
to serve compelling state interests.”49 This is “the most demanding test 
known to constitutional law.”50 Virtually every law fails to survive the 
46. Sean Patrick, Fairlawn panhandling rules get thumbs up, Akron.Com (May 31, 2012)
available at http://akron.com/akron-ohio-community-news.asp?aID=16096. 
47. Reed., 135 S. Ct. at 2228. 
48. See id. at 2229 (citing an “improper solicitation” regulation as a content-based 
restriction); Planet Aid, 782 F.3d at 328 (restriction on “charitable solicitation and giving” was 
content-based); accord, e.g., Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(concluding anti-panhandling law was content-based); Thayer v. City of Worcester, 2015 WL 
6872450, at *15 (D. Mass. Nov. 9, 2015) (same); McLaughlin, 2015 WL 6453144 (same); Browne 
v. City of Grand Junction, Colorado, 2015 WL 5728755 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2015) (same).
49. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226. 
50. Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes, 784 F.3d 1037, 1050 (6th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted). 
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strict scrutiny analysis.51 
When one appreciates the demands of the strict scrutiny test, it is 
not surprised that every single federal court to consider the matter has 
found anti-panhandling ordinances to fail strict scrutiny.52 In fact, 
recognizing the futility of the argument, other cities have not even 
bothered to defend their laws against a strict scrutiny analysis.53 
It is common for anti-panhandling ordinances to impose limits on 
when, where, and how people are permitted to ask for an immediate 
donation of money. The City of Akron, for example, bans solicitation 
after sunset.54 During winter months, when hours of daylight are limited 
in Northeast Ohio, this can mean that solicitation must stop as early as 5 
in the afternoon.55 This restriction explicitly includes solicitation that 
takes place on private property, thus making it illegal for the food bank, 
the art museum, the University of Akron, or anyone else in the city to 
request a donation after sunset even on their own property. There has 
been no evidence before, during, or after the ordinance’s enactment that 
would explain how such a broad and clumsy ban is carefully written to 
further a compelling interest. Indeed, both the Supreme Court and the 
Sixth Circuit have struck down such time restrictions on solicitation.56 
Another common—but regularly struck down57—provision found 
51. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012). 
52. E.g., Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2015); Thayer v. City of
Worcester, 2015 WL 6872450, at *15 (D. Mass. Nov. 9, 2015); McLaughlin, 2015 WL 6453144; 
Browne v. City of Grand Junction, Colorado, No. 14-CV-00809-CMA-KLM, 2015 WL 3568313, at 
*1 (D. Colo. June 8, 2015); American Civil Liberties Union of Idaho, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 2d at 917 ;
Guy, 2014 WL 4702289, at *5; Kelly , 978 F. Supp. 2d at 631. 
53. Norton v. City of Springfield, Ill., 806 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 2015); ACLU of Nevada v. 
City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 797 (9th Cir. 2006) (“As the City concedes, the solicitation 
ordinance cannot survive strict scrutiny.”). 
54. AKRON, OH, ORDINANCE 135.10(B) (2015).
55. AKRON, OH, USA — SUNRISE, SUNSET, AND DAYLENGTH, http://www.timeanddate.com/
sun/usa/akron?month=1 (last visited April 22, 2016).  
56. Ohio Citizen Action v. City of Englewood, 671 F.3d 564, 580 (6th Cir. 2012) (striking
down 6:00 P.M. curfew for door-to-door solicitation); City of Watseka v. Illinois Public Action 
Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 1558 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Watseka has failed to offer evidence that its 5:00 
P.M. to 9:00 P.M. ban on solicitation is narrowly tailored to achieve Watseka’s legitimate 
objectives. Watseka failed to show both the necessary relationship between the ban and its 
objectives, and that it could not achieve its objectives by less restrictive means.”), aff’d without 
opinion, 479 U.S. 1048 (1987). “[L]ower courts are bound by summary decisions by this Court until 
such time as the Court informs them that they are not.” Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 
(1975) (internal alterations and quotations omitted). 
57. See, e.g., Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 2015); Comite de
Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 949 (9th Cir. 2011) (en 
banc); Thayer v. City of Worcester, 2015 WL 6872450, at *15 (D. Mass. Nov. 9, 2015); 
McLaughlin, 2015 WL 6453144; Browne v. City of Grand Junction, Colorado, 2015 WL 5728755, 
at *13 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2015); Wilkinson v. Utah, 860 F.Supp.2d 1284, 1290 (D. Utah 2012). 
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in anti-panhandling ordinances are solicitation-free buffer zones around 
various locations in a city. Consider, for example, the City of Akron’s 
decision to establish solicitation-free zones around churches, the Akron 
Art Museum, the Lock 3 Park, the Akron Civic Theater, Canal Park 
Stadium, outdoor restaurants, and various other landmarks within the 
City.58 No valid government objective is apparent in these zones; they 
can be explained only by the censorial goal of sparing churchgoers, 
museum patrons, and park visitors the indignity of being exposed to 
panhandlers.59 A similar problem exists for solicitation-free zones 
around outdoor restaurants and bus stops,60 which have been struck 
down repeatedly by courts over the lack few years for being 
insufficiently tailored to a valid government goal.61 
Other buffer zones bear at least a plausible connection to legitimate 
government goals, but the lack of narrow tailoring has proved fatal for 
these geographic restrictions time and again. For example, restrictions 
on panhandling near busy intersections at least plausibly further a non-
censorial objective of preventing injury to panhandlers and motorists. 
Indeed, many cities’ geographic restrictions on panhandling are so 
ill-suited to further safety goals that they would fail even under the more 
friendly intermediate scrutiny. Under this more forgiving standard, a law 
“still must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental 
interest.”62 “As the [Supreme] Court explained in McCullen, however, 
the burden of proving narrow tailoring requires the County to prove that 
it actually tried other methods to address the problem.”63 Even 
potentially content-neutral bans on behavior commonly associated with 
panhandling—such as standing near a roadway—have failed to survive 
intermediate scrutiny given the lack of tailoring and evidence to support 
the restrictions.64 
Similarly unconstitutional are the ordinance’s provisions that 
58. AKRON, OH, ORDINANCE 135.10(B) (2015). 
59. In a different context and a different city, sidewalk congestion could conceivably be a
non-censorial motive for a content-neutral ban on speech in limited areas. However, the idea that 
sidewalk congestion is a genuine concern in the City of Akron is laughable. 
60. AKRON OH, ORDINANCE 135.10(C)(1), (8) (2015); FAIRLAWN, OH, ORDINANCE
636.26(b)(C), (E) (2015); SUMMIT CO., OH, ORDINANCE 537.15(c)(1)(C), (E) (2016). 
61. McLaughlin, 2015 WL 6453144, at *11 (“No theory or evidence has been offered as to
how pedestrians walking near an outdoor café are unusually threatened by panhandlers.”); 
American Civil Liberties Union of Idaho, Inc. 998 F.Supp.2d at 917. 
62. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2534 (quotation omitted). 
63. Reynolds, 779 F.3d at 231 (emphasis in original).
64. Cutting, No. 14-1421, 2015 WL 5306455, at *7 (striking down content-neutral 
restrictions used against panhandlers); Reynolds, 779 F.3d at 232 (same); Thayer v. City of 
Worcester, 2015 WL 6872450, at *14 (D. Mass. 2015) (same). 
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impose limits on how a donation may be requested. For example asking 
for a donation is a group of two or more is deemed “intimidating” in 
Fairlawn and Summit County and flatly prohibited,65 variously 
criminalizing two Salvation Army volunteers standing together to collect 
holiday donations, two Girl Scouts raising money for an animal shelter, 
or even a Halloween trick-or-treater accompanied by a parent. Plainly, 
this ban sweeps much more broadly than could possibly be justified by 
evidence-backed governmental objective, and “violate[s] not only 
speech rights but association and assembly rights as well.”66 In fact, the 
Supreme Court has already struck down a similar prohibition for exactly 
these reasons.67 This example provides an excellent illustration on why 
courts should look behind a city’s labeling of speech as “aggressive” or 
“intimidating,” and probe what precisely is being prohibited. 
Other restrictions on solicitation labelled “aggressive” raise similar 
issues. Akron, Fairlawn, and Summit County have adopted restrictions 
prohibiting a solicitor from blocking the path of a person, walking 
alongside a person, or asking a person to reconsider a “no” answer.68 
These provisions are not sufficiently related to the City’s goal of public 
safety (or any other compelling interest) to be justified. The City can 
regulate “true threats,” but standing in the middle of a sidewalk, walking 
alongside a person for a few feet while making your case, or asking a 
person who said “no” to reconsider hardly meets this standard.69 The 
lack of narrow tailoring proved fatal to three other ordinances containing 
indistinguishable provisions in the last year.70 
The broader issue with restrictions on solicitation labelled 
“intimidating” (or, for that matter “misleading”71) is that there is no 
65. FAIRLAWN, OH, ORDINANCE 636.26(c)(1)(E) (2015); SUMMIT CO., OH, ORDINANCE
537.15(d)(1)(E) (2016).  
66. Mead, supra note 9, at 62. 
67. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971) (striking down ordinance that
made it unlawful to assemble in 3 or more persons in a manner “annoying” to others). 
68. AKRON, OH, ORDINANCE 135.10(D) (2015); FAIRLAWN, OH, ORDINANCE 636.26(c)(B), 
(C) (2015); SUMMIT CO., OH, ORDINANCE 537.15(d)(1)(B), (C) (2016). 
69. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). 
70. See, e.g., Thayer v. City of Worcester, 2015 WL 6872450 (D. Mass. Nov. 9, 2015)
(striking down provisions against blocking path and following a person after they gave a negative 
response); McLaughlin, 2015 WL 6453144, at *9 (“The bans on following a person and 
panhandling after a person has given a negative response are not the least restrictive means 
available”); Browne v. City of Grand Junction, Colorado, 2015 WL 5728755, at *12-13 (D. Colo. 
Sept. 30, 2015) (“[T]he Court does not believe[] that a repeated request for money or other thing of 
value necessarily threatens public safety.”). 
71. AKRON, OH, ORDINANCE 135.10(E) (2015). As was true for behavior deemed
“intimidating,” the types of speech designated “misleading” are broader than simple fraud. For 
example, by restricting use of makeup and “indicia of physical disability,” Akron made it illegal for 
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reason why a content-based restriction is needed, particularly given the 
existence of content-neutral laws against, for instance, disorderly 
conduct and fraud.72 Even in the limited areas such as true threats, 
fighting words, obscenity, and fraud which are carved out from First 
Amendment protection, a government typically cannot impose content-
based bans.73 For example, even though a state may regulate obscenity, 
“it may not prohibit . . . only that obscenity which includes offensive 
political messages.”74 Even if the ordinances were more carefully 
written to prohibit only true threats and actual fraud, governments have 
no compelling reason for selectively criminalizing these categories based 
on the subject matter of the speech. And, once more, a court recently 
struck down a law against coercive panhandling on precisely these 
grounds.75 
Finally, perhaps the most odious provision of the Akron and 
Fairlawn ordinances are their mandate that all solicitors pre-register with 
the police by visiting a downtown police station, filling out an 
application, being photographed and fingerprinted, and obtaining a 
license before asking anyone for help.76 “It is offensive—not only to the 
values protected by the First Amendment, but to the very notion of a free 
society—that in the context of everyday public discourse a citizen must 
first inform the government of her desire to speak to her neighbors and 
then obtain a permit to do so.”77 Thus, the City of Cincinnati repealed its 
similar registration requirement for panhandlers following an adverse 
court decision.78 Tellingly, the City of Canton’s law director explained 
that a permit requirement for panhandlers would be unconstitutional.79 
The unconstitutionality of the registration mandates are 
underscored by the motives for enacting them. As explained in the 
trick or treaters to ask for donations to a charity while dressed as, for instance, a one-eyed, hook-
handed, or peg-legged pirate—despite the absence of any true risk of fraud. Akron Ord. 
135.10(E)(4)-(6).  
72. Ohio Rev. Code 2917.11. 
73. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (striking down content-based statute 
that regulated fighting words, even though government could have outlawed the same conduct in a 
content-neutral manner). 
74. Id. 
75. McLaughlin, 2015 WL 6453144, at *9 (striking down law against coercive panhandling). 
76. AKRON, OH, ORDINANCE 135.10(F) (2015); FAIRLAWN, OH, ORDINANCE 832.01 (2015). 
77. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
165–66 (2002).  
78. Henry v. City of Cincinnati, Ohio, No. C-1-03-509, 2005 WL 1198814 at *10 (S.D. Ohio 
2005).  
79. Kelly Byer, Panhandlers give their side; regulations, opinions differ, CantonRep.com,
http://cantonrep.com/article/20140707/NEWS/140709530. 
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testimony of Akron police captain Daniel Zampelli, the registration 
requirement would increase the “hassle factor” by “mak[ing] it easier for 
police to approach and question panhandlers, check for outstanding 
warrants and make sure they’re in compliance, even if they’re not being 
aggressive.”80 As the Act’s chief proponent, Deputy Mayor Lieberth, put 
it: “By requiring registration, we make it difficult for people to come 
into Akron and panhandle and then go back to their communities.”81 
Clearly, hassling speakers and making it difficult to speak are not 
legitimate government interests.82 Like the other pieces of these 
ordinances, the registration provisions are supported simply by a desire 
to censor instead of any valid government purpose. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the unanimity of recent decisions, anti-panhandling 
ordinances that target charitable solicitations for special restrictions 
appear doomed. In light of the Supreme Court’s teachings in Reed and 
McCullen, and the dozen lower court decisions implementing them, 
cities should revisit their anti-panhandling laws. Going forward, 
hopefully city councils will learn to respect the constitutional rights of 
everybody to ask for help, even when some in the community would 
prefer less speech. 
80. Council tightens restrictions on beggars: City hopes to satisfy merchants while avoiding
free speech suit, AKRON BEACON J., July, 11 2006.  
81. Sherry Karabin, Business owners weigh in on the city’s panhandling ordinance, AKRON 
LEGAL NEWS, May 27, 2011, available at http://www.akronlegalnews.com/editorial/233; see also 
Phil Trexler, New Akron law tightens panhandling, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, June 4, 2008 
(“Akron police say registration has helped keep the number of beggars constant.”).  
82. The goal of deterring panhandlers worked to some extent, as spontaneous speech (a
person who is stranded, for example) is made virtually impossible and the difficulties of traveling to 
the police station to register deter countless others. Bob Dyer, Beggars Multiply in Akron, AKRON 
BEACON JOURNAL, Oct 12, 2009 (“If you’re thinking about registering as a panhandler, be 
forewarned: It’s tougher than it looks. Of the folks who take out a temporary license, 62 percent do 
not follow through and get their permanent license.”). In fact, one of the supporters of the ordinance 
was a city officer who praised the fact that the registration requirement prohibited an individual who 
was passing through Akron and were “panhandling to get on a bus, or something like that” from 
communicating that need with Akron citizens. H’rg before the Akron Public Safety Committee, 
June 21, 2006 (on file with the Akron Clerk of Court) (at 34:00). Yet the ordinance also backfired, 
since it created a “City sanctioned ‘job’ called begging for money.” Brian Davis Testimony, 
NORTHEAST OHIO COALITION FOR HOMELESSNESS, available at http://www.neoch.org/akron-
panhandling-ordinance/. 
